The parties stated that they did not intend, until April 1999, to fly against a target ballistic missile, theatre anti-missile missiles (TMD), which are subject to the agreement on the delimitation of TMD systems at a higher speed; test TMD systems against target missiles with multiple independent re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) or against re-entry vehicles for use or use on strategic ballistic missiles; The parties also did not provide TMD systems equipped with intercept missiles at more than 5.5 km/s for land and air systems or 4.5 km/sec for maritime systems. During the review, the United States stressed the importance of Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty, which pose a threat to the treaty`s viability. Throughout the review conference, the Soviet Union did not indicate its readiness to correct violations without the agreement it gave to that objective to accept it. Unsurprisingly, the lack of consensus on the details of a treaty was reflected in inter-institutional disagreements in Washington. To help his superiors make a decision on the department`s position on a final ABM settlement, Spiers John Irwin reported five alternatives in descending order of preference: a ban on ABM (zero ABM), one for one, two for two, one-plus-one and two or one. As proposition one for one of the United States left the Soviets without an ICBM defense site, while it provided such a defense to the United States, Spiers probably saw that the Soviets would eventually accept a two-for-two, because there would be an ICBM defense site and a defense site in its capital. However, complex discussions would be needed before negotiations reached the point, before both sides agreed to a two-for-two solution. In April, the United States proposed an executive agreement that is not bound by the ABM treaty and included the exchange of data on defense programs, expert meetings, briefings, laboratory visits, test observations and ABM test reports. A week later, when negotiations were postponed, the U.S.
delegation sent a text of an ABM agreement jointly drawn up by the United States and Soviet delegations. The parentheses indicate which articles remained contested by either party. Controversial items included Articles II (system/component definitions), III (authorized deployments), V (3) (future systems) and V (c) (phase matrix radar restrictions).